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RETURNING TO ROE: THE RENEWED PROMISE 
OF WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH 
Cristina Salcedo* 
 
“Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt.”1 Yet nearly 
a quarter-century after Justice Kennedy first penned those words, 
abortion rights still stand on uncertain ground. 
Constitutional protections for abortion have been eroded since 
first announced in Roe v. Wade. Federal courts, including the Supreme 
Court, have narrowly construed the sweeping pronouncements of 
Roe.2 And state legislatures, largely in conservative states, have 
enacted laws restricting abortion under the guise of protecting 
women’s health.3 
In 2013, the Texas state legislature passed such a law: House Bill 
2 (“H.B. 2”).4 The Bill was ostensibly aimed at “protect[ing] life and 
protect[ing] women.”5 However, critics of the Bill argued it would 
“dramatically reduce some women’s access to safe, legal abortion.”6 
 
 * J.D. Candidate, May 2017, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A., Political Science, 
2013, California State University, Northridge. I would like to thank my parents for their 
unconditional love and support during law school. Special thanks are owed to Professor West-
Faulcon for her invaluable guidance and feedback throughout the writing process. Cristina Salcedo 
is an associate at Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP. The views expressed in the article 
are the author’s alone and should not be attributed to Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP 
or any other attorneys at the firm. 
 1. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992). 
 2. See infra, Section III. 
 3. See Amber Phillips, 14 States Have Passed Laws This Year Making It Harder to Get an 
Abortion, WASH. POST (June 1, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/ 
2016/06/01/14-states-have-passed-laws-making-it-harder-to-get-an-abortion-already-this-year. 
 4. H.B. 2, 83rd Leg., 2nd Called Sess. (Tx. 2013); Amber Phillips, Three States’ Abortion 
Laws Just Fell Thanks to the Supreme Court. These Could be Next., WASH. POST (June 28, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/06/27/how-many-states-could-see-their-
abortion-restrictions-struck-down-after-the-supreme-courts-big-ruling. 
 5. Ariel Walden, Governor Rick Perry Says Senate Bill 5 Will Defend Women’s Health And 
Rights of Unborn Children, 790 KYFO (July 1, 2013), http://kfyo.com/governor-rick-perry-says-
senate-bill-5-will-defend-womens-health-and-rights-of-unborn-children-audio/ (statements made 
by Texas Governor Rick Perry, who signed the Bill into law) (referring to H.B. 2 as Senate Bill 5). 
 6. Steffi Badanes, 5 Stories Show How Texas’ HB2 and Other Trap Laws Hurt Abortion 
Access, PLANNED PARENTHOOD (June 22, 2016), https://www.plannedparenthoodaction.org/blog/ 
5-womens-stories-show-how-texas-hb2-and-other-trap-laws-hurt-abortion-access. 
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Several women’s health clinics filed suit against Texas.7 The 
clinics challenged two provisions of the Bill: (1) a requirement that 
doctors performing abortions have admitting privileges at a nearby 
hospital (the “admitting privileges” requirement); and (2) a 
requirement that all abortion-providing facilities meet the rigorous 
standards of a surgical center (the “surgical center” requirement).8 
The case reached the Supreme Court, which struck down both 
provisions at issue by a 5-3 vote.9 Abortion activists across the country 
declared the decision as a victory. This paper argues that Whole 
Woman’s Health hewed closer to the vision articulated in Roe than the 
Court’s other post-Roe jurisprudence. 
I.  PRELUDE TO WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH 
A.  Factual Background 
H.B. 2’s passage was contentious. Before the Bill was voted on, 
the floor of the Texas legislature was filled with “often-angry 
debate[s]” between proponents and opponents of the legislation in 
what was described by some as an “unruly mob.”10 The Bill was also 
met with an eleven-hour filibuster conducted by Wendy Davis, a 
Democratic state Senator.11 But H.B. 2 still passed by a vote of 96 to 
49.12 
The controversy surrounding the Bill did not fade away. Several 
Texas abortion providers—health clinics and physicians—filed suit in 
the Western District of Texas to challenge the constitutionality of two 
of the Bill’s provisions: the admitting privileges requirement and the 
surgical center requirement.13 The admitting privileges provision 
required a “physician performing . . . an abortion” to “have active 
admitting privileges at a hospital that [] is located not further than 30 
miles from where the abortion [was] performed.”14 The surgical center 
provision required that abortion facilities satisfy the “minimum 
 
 7. Id. 
 8. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2300 (2016). 
 9. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, SCOTUSBLOG (June 27, 2016), http://www. 
scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/whole-womans-health-v-cole. 
 10. John Schwartz, Texas Resumes Efforts on Abortion Restrictions, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/10/us/texas-resumes-efforts-at-abortion-restriction.html. 
 11. Id. 
 12. LEGISCAN, https://legiscan.com/TX/bill/HB2/2013/X2 (last visited Sept. 11, 2016). 
 13. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2300. 
 14. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 171.0031(a) (Supp. 2014). 
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standards adopted by [Texas Health & Safety Code] Section 243.010 
for ambulatory surgical centers,” including adhering to “detailed 
specifications relating to the size of the nursing staff, building 
dimensions, and other building requirements.”15 
These two provisions had a devastating effect on women’s access 
to abortions in Texas. The court initially entered an injunction that was 
later lifted.16 In the lead-up to enforcement, several abortion clinics 
closed their doors.17 Upon taking effect, the number of abortion-
providing facilities in Texas dropped to only eight.18 In essence, the 
Bill meant “fewer doctors, longer waiting times, and increased 
crowding” for Texas women seeking abortions.19 
B.  Procedural History 
The district court found H.B. 2 unconstitutional.20 It found that 
both provisions together and independently violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process Clause.21 The court ruled that H.B. 2’s 
provisions substantially burdened abortion rights “in a way that is 
incompatible with the principles of personal freedom and privacy 
protected by the United States Constitution for the 40 years since Roe 
v. Wade.”22 
Nevertheless, on appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district 
court on the merits.23 The Fifth Circuit applied a two-part test in which 
it first reviewed the law under rational basis scrutiny, then examined 
to see if the law unduly burdened abortion rights.24 It found that there 
was “no record evidence” to support the district court’s finding that 
the Bill imposed an undue burden on abortion.25 The Fifth Circuit held 
that both provisions were constitutional because the admitting 
 
 15. Id. § 245.010(a); 25 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 139.40 (2012); Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. 
Ct. at 2314. 
 16. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2300. 
 17. Id. at 2301. 
 18. Id. at 2313 (citing Whole Woman’s Health v. Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d 673, 680–81 (2014) 
(“After September 1, 2014, only seven facilities and a potential eighth will exist in Texas.”)). 
 19. Id. 
 20. Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d at 676. 
 21. Id. at 678. 
 22. Id. at 686. 
 23. Whole Woman’s Health v. Lakey, 769 F.3d 285, 296 (5th Cir. 2014). 
 24. Id. at 293. 
 25. Id. at 294–95. 
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privileges requirement and the surgical center requirement were 
rationally related to a legitimate state interest.26 
II.  HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK 
A.  Roe v. Wade (1973) 
The Supreme Court first recognized a constitutional right to an 
abortion four decades ago in Roe v. Wade.27 The Roe Court faced the 
issue of whether a Texas statute criminalizing abortion was 
constitutional.28 It held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment implies a right to privacy that includes the right to 
terminate a pregnancy.29 
Roe did not shy away from confronting the consequences of an 
unwanted pregnancy in the lives of women.30 It recognized that 
forcing a woman to carry a pregnancy to term may cause “the woman 
a distressful life and future.”31 Roe even went so far as to state that 
“[p]sychological harm may be imminent” in an unwanted pregnancy 
and “[m]ental and physical health may be taxed by child care.”32 
However, Roe did not hold that women have a limitless right to 
an abortion.33 Rather, Roe concluded that women (and their doctors) 
had full control of abortion decisions only through the first trimester 
of pregnancy.34 Roe declared that states could regulate abortion after 
the first trimester to protect women’s health.35 States could also 
regulate to protect the potential life of the fetus—including entirely 
prohibiting abortion—at the point of fetal viability, which the Court 
held to be the start of the third trimester.36 
 
 26. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The Fifth Circuit did not explicitly state what the 
“legitimate state interest” was. 
 27. 410 U.S. 113, 153(1973). 
 28. Id. at 166; see 1857 TEX. CRIM. STAT. 531–536, invalidated by Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 
113 (1973); GEO W. PASCHAL, LAWS OF TEXAS 447 (5th ed. 1878); 1879 TEX. CRIM. STAT. 536–
541; 1911 TEXAS REV. CRIM. STAT. 1071–1076. 
 29. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153 (“This right of privacy . . . is broad enough to encompass a woman’s 
decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.”); see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 30. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153–54. 
 31. Id. at 153. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 160, 164–65. 
 34. Id. at 164. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 163–64. 
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B.  Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992) 
The Court constricted abortion rights in Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.37 The Casey Court deviated from 
Roe’s categorical prohibition on first-trimester abortion regulations in 
crafting the “undue burden” standard.38 It held that laws regulating 
abortion were constitutional unless the “purpose or effect” of the law 
was “to place substantial obstacles in the path of a woman seeking an 
abortion before the fetus attains viability.”39 But the Court did identify 
unnecessary health regulations” as imposing an undue, and thus 
unconstitutional, burden on abortion rights.40 
Casey set forth three major guidelines for applying the “undue 
burden” standard.41 First, prior to viability, a woman has the right to 
obtain an abortion without “undue interference” from a state.42 
Second, states retain the right to restrict abortion rights post-viability, 
so long as the law provides exceptions when the life of the mother is 
endangered.43 Third, a “[s]tate has legitimate interests from the outset 
of the pregnancy in protecting the health of the woman and the life of 
the fetus that may become a child.”44 In so holding, Casey rejected 
Roe’s trimester model in order “[t]o promote the State’s profound 
interest in potential life.”45 
C.  Gonzales v. Carhart (2007) 
In Gonzales v. Carhart, the Court dealt with the constitutionality 
of the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003.46 The Carhart Court 
reiterated Casey’s “undue burden” standard.47 But the Court 
nevertheless upheld a ban on intentionally performing partial-birth 
abortions in the second trimester that are not necessary to save the life 
of the mother.48 The Court focused on the third prong of Casey in 
 
 37. 505 U.S. 833 (2007); After Ayotte: The Need to Defend Abortion Rights With Renewed 
“Purpose”, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2552, 2556 (2006). (“In 1992, the Supreme Court decided Casey, 
redefining abortion doctrine.”). 
 38. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846. 
 39. Id. at 837. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 846. 
 42. Id. at 846. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. (emphasis added). 
 45. Id. at 878. 
 46. 550 U.S. 124, 124–32 (2007). 
 47. Id. at 146. 
 48. Id. at 168. 
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holding that “[r]egulations which do no more than create a structural 
mechanism by which the State . . . may express profound respect for 
the life of the unborn are permitted, if they are not a substantial 
obstacle to the woman’s exercise of the right to choose.”49 In the face 
of “medical uncertainty” as to whether the Act “subject[ed] women to 
significant health risks,” the Court held that “the Act can survive facial 
attack when this medical uncertainty persists.”50 
Justice Ginsburg’s Carhart dissent rejected the majority’s view 
that claimed medical uncertainty justified a blanket ban on an abortion 
procedure prior to viability.51 She observed that the opinion “tolerates, 
indeed applauds, federal intervention to ban nationwide a procedure 
found necessary and proper in certain cases by the American College 
of Obstetricians and Gynecologists” and, “for the first time 
since Roe,” “blesses a prohibition with no exception safeguarding a 
woman’s health.”52 
III.  THE WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH DECISION 
The 2016 case of Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt marked 
the Court’s most recent foray into the realm of abortion rights.53 The 
Court was tasked with determining the constitutionality of H.B. 2, 
which the Texas legislature passed two years earlier.54 Overruling the 
Fifth Circuit, the Court engaged in a skeptical factual analysis and 
ultimately struck down the bill. 
Before reversing the Fifth Circuit, the Whole Woman’s Health 
Court stated it was following the “undue burden” rule set out in 
Casey.55 But unlike the Casey Court, the Whole Woman’s Health 
Court held that courts must consider not only “the burdens a law 
imposes on abortion access,” but also “the benefits those laws confer” 
in ruling on a law’s constitutionality.56 
 
 49. Id. at 146. 
 50. Id. at 129. 
 51. Id. at 169–71. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 52. Id. at 170–71. 
 53. 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016). 
 54. See Schwartz, supra note 10; Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2300. 
 55. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2300 (“[E]ach [provision] constitutes an undue 
burden on abortion access, and each violates the Constitution.”). 
 56. Id. at 2309. 
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A.  The Court’s Admitting Privileges Analysis 
The Court first considered whether the admitting privileges 
provision placed an undue burden on abortion rights.57 H.B. 2 required 
doctors who performed abortions to possess admitting privileges at a 
hospital within thirty miles of where the doctor was performing the 
abortion.58 After engaging in a skeptical analysis, the Court struck 
down the provision for imposing a substantial burden without a 
corresponding benefit. 
There was no evidence that admitting privileges actually provided 
a benefit to women’s health.59 Texas claimed “the purpose of the 
admitting-privileges requirement is to help ensure that women have 
easy access to a hospital should complications arise during an abortion 
procedure.”60 However, at oral argument, Texas admitted that it could 
not name a single instance in which the admitting-privileges 
requirement could have “helped even one woman obtain better 
treatment.”61 
The admitting privilege requirement was also extremely arduous 
to satisfy. Hospitals often condition admitting privileges “on reaching 
a certain number of admissions [to an emergency room] per year.”62 
However, it is very rare that someone getting an abortion needs to be 
transferred to an emergency room.63 Of the 17,000 abortions 
performed over a decade at one El Paso clinic, no patient required 
emergency service.64 It was thus extremely unlikely that any doctor 
providing abortions could even obtain the admitting privileges 
required under the Bill. 
Nor was the requirement logical. Admitting privileges do not 
indicate quality, as they typically do not correspond to a doctor’s skill 
level. At academic hospitals, for example, admitting privileges may 
be given to physicians on the condition that they accept a faculty 
appointment.65 
 
 57. Id. at 2310–19. 
 58. Id. at 2310. 
 59. Id. at 2311–12. 
 60. Id. at 2311. 
 61. Id. at 2311–12. 
 62. Id. at 2312. 
 63. Id. at 2311. 
 64. Id. at 2312. (citing Brief of Society Hospital Medicine et al. as Amici Curiae, No. 15-274, 
136 S. Ct. 2292, 2016 WL 74953 at * 11). 
 65. Id. at 2312. 
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B.  The Court’s Surgical Center Requirement Analysis 
The Court next examined the surgical center requirement of H.B. 
2.66 H.B. 2 required abortion-providing facilities to satisfy the same 
minimum standards as those of ambulatory surgical centers.67 Here 
too, the Court struck down the requirement. 
The Court agreed with the district court’s finding that the 
“surgical-center [requirement did] not benefit patients and [was] not 
necessary.”68 It did not help patients who suffer complications after 
the procedure because “complications . . . almost always arise only 
after the patient has left the facility.”69 The Court also recognized that 
abortions performed in Texas were “extremely safe”¾even more so 
than procedures that were not subject to the surgical-center 
requirement¾and thus “there was no significant health-related 
problem that the new law helped to cure.”70 
In light of this evidence, the Court held that both provisions at 
issue posed an undue burden on abortion rights.71 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
Casey and Carhart departed from Roe’s articulation of abortion 
rights in both reasoning and result. An examination of the Court’s 
jurisprudence illustrates how Whole Woman’s Health, though 
imperfect, was truer to the spirit of Roe. 
A.  Casey & Carhart: Departures from Roe 
After Roe, the Court narrowed its abortion rights jurisprudence. 
Later opinions modified, limited, and rejected various aspects of Roe’s 
broad view of abortion rights. 
Roe embodies the most expansive view of abortion rights yet 
embraced by the Court. Roe held that when “fundamental 
rights”¾including abortion rights¾are at issue, the Court must 
examine the legislation at issue with strict scrutiny.72 Roe ruled that in 
 
 66. Id. at 2314. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 2315. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 2311. 
 71. Id. at 2299. 
 72. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) (“Where certain ‘fundamental rights’ are involved, 
the Court has held regulation limiting these rights may be justified by only a ‘compelling state 
interest.’”) (citations omitted). 
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the first trimester of pregnancy, a woman’s decision of whether to 
elect to have an abortion is within the sole discretion of her and her 
doctor.73 Roe also held that states can only regulate abortion to protect 
“the potentiality of human life” after the “compelling point” of 
viability.74 
Casey departed from Roe in a significant manner. The plurality 
opinion purported to “reaffirm” Roe’s “essential holding” that women 
have a constitutional right to an abortion pre-viability.75 Yet rather 
than following Roe’s lead in casting this right as virtually unassailable, 
the Casey Court hedged: the right to a first-trimester abortion could 
not be subjected to “undue” state interference, such as the imposition 
of a “substantial obstacle to the woman’s effective right to elect the 
procedure.”76 
Casey also rejected some of the critical tenets of Roe as “rigid.”77 
Unlike Roe, Casey held “that the State has legitimate interests from 
the outset of the pregnancy . . . in protecting the life of the fetus.”78 
Thus, under Casey, states could restrict abortion rights “from the 
outset of pregnancy.”79 
Casey also did away with the strict scrutiny analysis followed in 
Roe. Instead, the plurality in Casey engineered the amorphous “undue 
burden” standard.80 While Roe had allowed pre-viability restrictions 
on abortion only to promote “the health of the mother,”81 the new 
standard set forth no such limitations. Instead, such restrictions were 
only impermissible if they imposed “[a] substantial obstacle to the 
woman’s effective right to” have an abortion.82 The Court admitted 
that this rule was crafted in part to “accommodat[e] the State’s 
profound interest in potential life.”83 Most strikingly, under Casey, 
legislation would be upheld even “if [its] purpose is [to encourage 
women] to choose childbirth over abortion.”84 
 
 73. Id. at 163. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 845–46 (1992). 
 76. Id. at 846. 
 77. Id. at 837 (“Roe’s rigid trimester framework is rejected.”). 
 78. Id. at 834 (emphasis added). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973). 
 82. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846. 
 83. Id. at 837. 
 84. Id. 
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Given Casey’s limited reading of Roe, it is not surprising that the 
Court blessed many of the provisions at issue. Casey found that both 
the 24-hour waiting period and parental consent requirements did not 
impose an “undue burden” on abortion rights,85 though it overturned 
the provision that would require women to notify their husbands 
before obtaining an abortion.86 
Casey’s analysis largely disregarded the factual background. 
Though ostensibly determining whether the provisions at issue posed 
an undue burden to abortion access, the Court focused on precedent to 
the exclusion of facts. In striking down the parental notification 
requirement, the Court relied entirely on precedent.87 And the Court 
ignored the underlying facts in upholding both the 24-hour waiting 
period and the parental notification provisions.88 The Court’s decision 
to do so was curious; it is difficult to gauge whether something 
imposes an undue burden on abortion rights without examining the 
facts. 
The Casey plurality’s application of the undue burden standard 
rang hollow. The Court claimed that laws that impose an “undue 
burden” on abortion rights must be struck down. Yet the plurality was 
not concerned that the waiting period would “result in delays for some 
women that might not otherwise exist,”89 nor that the waiting period 
would “subject many women to the harassment and hostility of anti-
abortion protestors.”90 Instead, it stated “[t]he idea that important 
decisions will be more informed and deliberate if they follow some 
period of reflection does not strike us as unreasonable.”91 Overlooking 
the lower court’s factual findings, it claimed “they do not demonstrate 
that the waiting period constitutes an undue burden.”92 
The Court ultimately found the waiting period was constitutional 
because it “in no way prohibit[ed] abortion.”93 In essence, the Court 
held that legislation does not impose an “undue burden” on abortion if 
 
 85. Id. at 840–41. 
 86. Id. at 896–99. 
 87. Id. at 899 (“Our cases establish, and we reaffirm today, that a State may require a minor 
seeking an abortion to obtain the consent of a parent or guardian.”). 
 88. Id. at 881–82, 899. 
 89. Id. at 969 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 90. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 744 F. Supp. 1323, 1351 (E.D. Pa. 1990). 
 91. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 885 (1992). 
 92. Id. at 886 
 93. Id. at 969 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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it does not prohibit abortion, even if it may significantly prevent 
women from obtaining one. 
Carhart exacerbated the problem created by Casey. The case 
essentially gutted whatever protections Casey retained.94 The Carhart 
Court shifted its focus away from the rights of women and effectively 
applied the lowest level of scrutiny to abortion rights. 
Unlike in Casey, the Court in Carhart did not bother with the 
pretense of being concerned with the right of women to control their 
own reproductive functions.95 Instead, Carhart centered its analysis 
on the State’s interest in potential life and on the purported side effects 
of abortion on women. Carhart echoed the Casey Court’s comment 
that “the Court’s precedents after Roe had ‘undervalue[d] the State’s 
interest in potential life.’”96 Without citing to any evidence, the Court 
concluded that a troubling “phenomenon” of women regretting their 
abortions existed.97 According to the Court, abortion can thus cause 
“[s]evere depression and loss of esteem.”98 
The Carhart Court missed the question it should have asked. Roe 
established that abortion is a fundamental right, and any infringement 
on a fundamental right must be substantially justified. For all its flaws, 
Casey’s “undue burden” standard focused on the right question: To 
what extent did the law at issue restrict the exercise of a fundamental 
right? Contrarily, Carhart focused on whether the perceived harms 
posed by abortion justified the law at issue. 
The Court also applied an improper level of scrutiny. In 
considering whether the provision should be upheld, the Court noted 
that Congress “[had] a rational basis to act.”99 It also thought Congress 
had acted in “furtherance of its legitimate interests . . . to promote 
respect for life, including life of the unborn.”100 Effectively, the Court 
applied rational basis review. When the lowest standard of review is 
applied to a fundamental right, it ceases to be a fundamental right. 
 
 94. See Russell K. Robinson, Unequal Protection, 68 STAN. L. REV. 151, 209–10 (2016). 
 95. Compare Casey, 505 U.S. at 835 (“The ability of women to participate equally in the 
economic and social life of the Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control their 
reproductive lives.”), with Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007) (“[S]ome women come 
to regret their choice to abort the infant life they once created and sustained.”). 
 96. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 157–58 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 873). 
 97. Id. at 159. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 158–59. 
 100. Id. at 158. 
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With respect to partial-birth abortions, Carhart effectively overturned 
the rights announced in Roe. 
B.  The (Partial) Remedy of Whole Woman’s Health 
Whole Woman’s Health was a significant improvement on the 
Court’s recent jurisprudence and truer to the spirit of Roe. Though the 
Court did not return to the strict line-drawing that Roe resorted to, it 
treated restrictions on abortion with skepticism and an unwillingness 
to defer to the legislature. 
In Whole Woman’s Health, the Court claimed to follow Casey’s 
“undue burden” standard, but in reality pivoted back to Roe’s stringent 
skepticism of abortion regulations. First, Whole Woman’s Health held 
that “courts [must] consider the burdens a law imposes on abortion 
access together with the benefits those laws confer.”101 More 
importantly, the Court’s analysis in Whole Woman’s Health was 
generally more skeptical of whether the provisions at issue placed an 
undue burden on abortion, and thus more reminiscent of Roe’s strict 
scrutiny standard. In Casey, only one of the three provisions at issue 
was struck down.102 Whole Woman’s Health, though claiming to 
follow in Casey’s footsteps, invalidated both of the provisions at 
issue.103 
Whole Woman’s Health added to Casey’s “undue burden” test by 
weighing whether the medical benefits of a regulation justified the 
burden on abortion rights.104 Under this standard, a law with no 
medical benefits could be struck down even if it imposed only a 
minimal burden on abortion rights. This standard permits the Court to 
strike down pretextual laws that collectively add up to destroy access 
to abortions, even if individually they pose few obstacles. 
This new formulation of the “undue burden” test is more in line 
with the spirit of Roe. Roe recognized abortion as a fundamental 
right.105 Courts generally view restrictions on fundamental rights with 
disfavor, and require such restrictions to further compelling state 
interests.106 Roe laid out clear guidelines as to what constitutes such a 
state interest and when such interests arise. Whole Woman’s Health’s 
 
 101. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2309 (2016). 
 102. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 881–82 (1992). 
 103. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2309. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,153 (1973). 
 106. See, e.g., id. at 155. 
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focus on the benefits posed by abortion-restricting legislation reflects 
a similar concern about interfering with a fundamental right. 
Whole Woman’s Health also engaged in a careful factual analysis 
of the effects of the provision that is more in keeping with the strict 
scrutiny standard articulated in Roe. Such a factual analysis—which 
the Casey Court refused to engage in—allows the Court to look at the 
negative effects that abortion restrictions have on access to abortions, 
rather than relying on findings made by a legislature possibly acting 
in bad faith. Looking at facts is necessary to determine not only what 
the benefits of the law are, but also the level of burden posed by a 
particular restriction. Whole Woman’s Health showed that facts 
matter. In support of its opinion, the Court cited fifteen factual 
conclusions that the trial court had reached.107 Each factual conclusion 
illustrated the effect H.B. 2 had on women seeking abortions in 
Texas.108 
C.  Justice Ginsburg’s Concurrence 
In her concurrence, Justice Ginsburg went farther than the Court 
in rebuking the Texas Legislature. Beyond merely determining that 
the Bill substantially burdened abortion rights, she also rejected the 
notion that H.B. 2 was passed in good faith.109 She penned, “it is 
beyond rational belief that H.B. 2 [was enacted to] protect the health 
of women.”110 
Justice Ginsburg argued that H.B. 2 was nothing more than an 
“impediment[] to abortion.”111 Ginsburg pointed out that 
“[c]omplication rates from abortion are very low.”112 In contrast to the 
majority, she noted that childbirth—the proposed alternative to 
abortion—has a higher risk of medical complications than abortion 
itself.113 Yet childbirth is not “subject to ambulatory-surgical-center 
or hospital admitting-privileges requirements.”114 
 
 107. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2301–03. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 2321 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 2321 (citing Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Schimel, 806 F.3d 908, 912 (7th 
Cir. 2015)). 
 112. Id. at 2320 (citing Brief of Amicus Curiae of The American Civil Liberties Union, The 
ACLU of Alabama, The ACLU of Wisconsin, 2015 WL 958314 at *7). 
 113. Id. at 2320. 
 114. Id. 
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Ginsburg argued that, if anything, regulations such as H.B. 2 put 
women’s health in jeopardy. When “a State severely limits access to 
safe and legal procedures, women in desperate circumstances may 
resort to unlicensed rogue practitioners.”115 She claimed that H.B. 2 
was one of a species of regulations targeting abortion providers that 
“do little or nothing for health, but rather strew impediments to 
abortion.”116 Thus, she stated, “they cannot survive judicial 
inspection.”117 
Although Whole Woman’s Health was a clear improvement on 
Casey and Carhart, Justice Ginsburg’s concurrence is even closer to 
the spirit of Roe. Justice Ginsburg did not explicitly argue for a return 
to the strict scrutiny standard. Yet she openly questioned the true intent 
of the Texas Legislature and thereby essentially subjected the law to a 
heightened level of scrutiny. 
D.  What the Opinion Lacked 
Whole Woman’s Health is still far from perfect. Under traditional 
constitutional jurisprudence, when fundamental rights such as 
abortion rights are at stake, a court must examine the statute with strict 
scrutiny.118 Yet Whole Woman’s Health did not return to Roe’s strict 
scrutiny standard and instead claimed to apply Casey’s more 
deferential standard.119 Many have criticized Casey’s “undue burden” 
standard as being not only “more permissive”120 than the strict scrutiny 
standard used in Roe, but also “weakly and inconsistently” applied.121 
The undue burden standard, even as applied in Whole Woman’s 
Health, still permits courts to apply the standard subjectively and thus 
inconsistently. 
 
 115. Id. at 2321. 
 116. Id. (citing Schimel, 806 F.3d at 912) (internal quotation omitted). 
 117. Id. 
 118. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) (citing Kramer v. Union Free School District, 
395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969); Sherbert v. Verner, 
374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963)). 
 119. See Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2310–19. 
 120. Wharton, et al., Preserving the Core of Roe: Reflections of Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 
18 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 317, 330 (2006). 
 121. Margaret Talbot, The Supreme Court’s Just Application of the Undue-Burden Standard 
for Abortion, THE NEW YORKER, (June 27, 2016), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-
desk/the-supreme-courts-just-application-of-the-undue-burden-standard-for-abortion. 
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Nor did the Whole Woman’s Health majority question the Texas 
legislature’s motivations for passing H.B. 2.122 Perhaps it should have 
followed Justice Ginsburg’s lead. Given the Bill’s negligible medical 
benefits, and the devastating impact of the Bill on access to abortions, 
it seems clear that the legislation was enacted for the purpose of 
reducing abortions. The Court’s failure to critique the Texas 
Legislature is more in keeping with Casey than Roe; the Casey Court 
held that legislation may not be an undue burden on abortion rights 
even “if [its] purpose is [to encourage women] to choose childbirth 
over abortion.”123 
 The opinion also struck an overly sterilized tone. Commentators 
have criticized Whole Women’s Health for its almost surgical 
approach to an issue that affects women across the country on a very 
personal level.124 Yale Law Professor Linda Greenhouse argued that 
if an alien had landed on earth and read the opinion, it “would have 
had no hint of the decades-long battle over women’s right to abortion 
and dogged efforts by states to put obstacles in their way.”125 Put 
another way, “[t]here is no poetry in the 40-page opinion.”126 
Despite its flaws, the Whole Woman’s Health decision has 
undoubtedly protected abortion rights throughout the country. The 
decision clears the way for challenges to abortion statutes in roughly 
a dozen other states, including ten states with similar “admitting 
privileges” requirements.127 After the decision, Alabama’s attorney 
general vowed he would no longer defend his state’s own admitting 
privileges statute because he could no longer argue in good faith that 
it is constitutional.128 
 
 122. Lyle Denniston, Opinion Analysis: Abortion Rights Reemerge Strongly, SCOTUSBLOG 
(June 27, 2016), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/06/opinion-analysis-abortion-rights-reemerge-
strongly. 
 123. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 837 (1992). 
 124. Linda Greenhouse, The Facts Win out on Abortion, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/28/opinion/the-facts-win-out-on-abortion.html. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Phillips, supra note 4; Denniston, supra note 122. The states with similar admitting 
privileges statutes are Alabama, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, North Dakota, 
Oklahoma, Tennessee, Utah, and Wisconsin. 
 128. Id. 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
Whole Woman’s Health is a welcome relief to abortion rights 
activists across the country. Not only did the decision invalidate one 
of the most restrictive anti-abortion laws in the country, it also 
reinvigorated abortion rights after decades of Court retrenchment post-
Roe. Though claiming to follow the undue burden standard, the Whole 
Woman’s Health Court has plotted a new course—one that may lead 
back to Roe’s America. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
